Frequently asked questions

Four roles, not one person

A carer case has to keep four positions distinct, even where they overlap: the applicant (the proposed carer); the Australian relative the applicant claims to care for, a relative who is an Australian citizen, permanent resident or eligible New Zealand citizen [cl 116.211]; the sponsor; and the person with the medical condition, who must be an Australian citizen, Australian permanent resident or eligible New Zealand citizen [reg 1.15AA(1)(ba)]. For the carer definition, the resident must be an Australian citizen usually resident in Australia, an Australian permanent resident or an eligible New Zealand citizen; the usual-residence words attach to the Australian-citizen limb [reg 1.15AA(1)]. Paragraph 1.15AA(1)(a) separately requires the applicant to be a relative of that resident [reg 1.15AA(1)(a)]. The applicant must satisfy every element of the carer definition at once, and a strong case on one element does not carry the others [reg 1.15AA]. A relationship diagram is worth drawing at the outset, because the relative link, the sponsorship, the care need and the family relationships all have to be consistent with each other.

Relative and family unit are defined, and narrower than everyday usage

Relative for this visa means a close relative (spouse or de facto partner, child, parent, brother or sister, plus stepchild, stepbrother and stepsister) or a grandparent, grandchild, aunt, uncle, niece or nephew, or their step-equivalents [reg 1.03 def relative] [reg 1.03 def close relative]. First and second cousins are relatives only for a Subclass 200 (Refugee) visa or a protection visa, so a cousin does not qualify here [reg 1.03 def relative]. For a niece or nephew, the chain runs through the sibling link between the applicant's parent and the Australian relative, and that link has to be evidenced. Member of the family unit takes its meaning from reg 1.12: the family head's spouse or de facto partner, and their child or stepchild who is under 18, or 18 to 22 and dependent, or 23 or over and dependent under reg 1.05A(1)(b), plus a dependent child of such a child [reg 1.12] [reg 1.05A]. The wider household-relative extension in reg 1.12(4) applies only to the protection and humanitarian visas listed there, not to a carer visa.

The person needing care can be a minor

There is no minimum age on the person with the medical condition. The turned-18 requirement sits on the sponsor: either the Australian relative or that relative's cohabiting spouse or de facto partner, each of whom must have turned 18 [cl 116.212]. So where the person who actually needs care is a child, the file is normally built around an adult Australian relative as the resident, with the qualifying medical condition seated in a member of that resident's family unit [reg 1.15AA(1)(b)(i)], and with the resident having a permanent or long-term need for assistance in providing the direct assistance the child requires [reg 1.15AA(1)(d)].

The certificate decides the medical facts

The medical side of the carer definition is not argued in the ordinary way; it is established by a certificate. Regulation 1.15AA(2) requires a certificate based on a medical assessment carried out on behalf of the health service provider the Minister specifies (currently Bupa Health Services, trading as Bupa Medical Visa Services [reg 1.15AA(2)] [LIN 24/040]), signed by the medical adviser who carried it out, or a review certificate from that provider. In practice this is the Carer Visa Assessment Certificate (CVAC). The Minister must take the opinion in a compliant certificate, on the medical-condition matters, to be correct [reg 1.15AA(3)]. The delegate therefore does not re-decide the diagnosis, impairment or rating; the certificate governs those findings.

What the certificate must establish

Four things must line up on the certificate [reg 1.15AA(1)(b)]: a person (the resident or a member of the resident's family unit) has a medical condition; that condition causes physical, intellectual or sensory impairment of the person's ability to attend to the practical aspects of daily life; the impairment carries a rating under the Impairment Tables, meaning the Tables in subsection 23(1) of the Social Security Act 1991; and, because of the condition, the person has and will continue for at least two years to have a need for direct assistance with those practical aspects of daily life.

The rating must reach the specified level: 30

The rating on the certificate must equal or exceed the impairment rating the Minister specifies by instrument, which is 30 [reg 1.15AA(1)(c)] [IMMI 17/126]. This is the hard floor of the medical threshold: a distressing or serious-sounding diagnosis that rates below 30, or that does not translate into a continuing need for direct daily-life assistance, does not satisfy the carer definition. How current the certificate must be is a matter of departmental policy rather than the Regulations, so the acceptable age of a CVAC at decision should be checked against current policy before relying on an older one.

The applicant's own health is a separate criterion

The certificate settles the care receiver's medical facts; it says nothing about the applicant's own health. The proposed carer, and each family member who is also an applicant, must independently satisfy the health criterion PIC 4005 [cl 116.223] [cl 116.226] [PIC 4005]. PIC 4005 carries no ministerial waiver on its significant-cost ground, unlike PIC 4007 used on some other visas, so a single costly condition in the applicant or a migrating family member cannot be waived. A family member who is not migrating must still meet PIC 4005 unless the Minister is satisfied it would be unreasonable to require the assessment [cl 116.226A]. The two medical enquiries run independently: a strong care-receiver certificate does not cure an applicant-side PIC 4005 problem, and neither substitutes for the other.

Practical daily-life assistance, not company or preference

The need the definition targets is a need for direct assistance in attending to the practical aspects of daily life, arising from the rated medical condition [reg 1.15AA(1)(b)(iv)]. That is the qualifying subject matter: hands-on help with the tasks of living. A wish for family closeness, emotional support, or company, however genuine, is not itself the relevant need, and neither is help that is merely convenient or recreational.

What can fall within practical daily life

The regulation does not itemise the tasks, so the following are examples of what practical daily-life assistance can include, not a closed statutory list: mobility and transfers; personal care such as washing, dressing and toileting; medication and medical management; meal preparation and feeding; household tasks tied to the impairment; transport; communication; cognitive prompting; and supervision for safety. What matters is that each claimed task traces back to the rated impairment and is something the person cannot manage alone, rather than a general household service the family would simply like provided.

Make the need concrete

Because the need has to be shown rather than asserted, the practical tool is a day-in-the-life statement or a structured care table that converts the impairment into specific tasks: what assistance is needed, how often, who currently provides it, and what any existing service actually covers. That evidence ties the care need back to the medical certificate and makes the care burden visible and measurable rather than a general assertion.

A single negative test with two branches

Even with a rated medical condition and a willing carer, the definition is not met unless the required assistance cannot reasonably be provided by another Australian relative, and cannot reasonably be obtained from welfare, hospital, nursing or community services in Australia [reg 1.15AA(1)(e)]. Both branches must be satisfied. The standard is reasonableness, not absolute impossibility, so the file has to show that the realistic alternatives do not reasonably cover the actual care need, not merely that the applicant is preferred.

Other Australian relatives

The relatives branch looks at other relatives of the resident who are Australian citizens, permanent residents or eligible New Zealand citizens [reg 1.15AA(1)(e)(i)]. A bare assertion that relatives are busy, unwilling, stressed, or culturally prefer the applicant is weak. For each relevant relative the file should set out where they live, their work and family responsibilities, their own health, their relationship with the resident, what care they already provide, and the specific reasons they cannot reasonably provide the required care. The decision-maker may also consider whether relatives could provide the care together, including combined or rotational arrangements, so the submission should meet that possibility rather than ignore it.

Australian services

The services branch asks whether the assistance can reasonably be obtained from welfare, hospital, nursing or community services in Australia [reg 1.15AA(1)(e)(ii)]. A service merely existing in the area does not end the inquiry. Reasonable obtainability is assessed against the actual care need: service hours and intensity against the level of care required, eligibility and cost, wait times and location, and whether the service fits the person's linguistic, cultural or religious needs. The useful submission researches the real services, documents any refusals or limits, and compares them against the daily-care need, rather than assuming services are unavailable or waving them away. The line is between a service that cannot reasonably meet the need and a service that could meet it but has been unreasonably rejected.

A separate requirement, and a practical one

Satisfying the no-reasonable-alternative test does not by itself qualify the applicant. The applicant must also be willing and able to provide to the resident the substantial and continuing assistance of the kind the definition requires [reg 1.15AA(1)(f)]. This is a distinct requirement, and "able" is practical, not merely a stated willingness: the applicant has to be realistically capable of delivering the level and duration of care the rated impairment calls for.

What ability turns on

The regulation does not set out a checklist, so the following are the practical matters that bear on ability, assessed on the facts: the applicant's own age, health and mobility; their relevant skills or caring experience; their relationship with the resident and readiness to take on the role; their availability over time and ability to remain available; and their capacity to support themselves financially while caring. Willingness does not carry the point if the applicant's own health, work plan, financial position, or accompanying family commitments would make the care unrealistic. A plan to work full-time is not disqualifying in itself, but the care plan then has to explain how substantial and continuing care will still be delivered.

Tie ability to the actual tasks

The convincing submission does not rest on a declaration of willingness. It translates the rated impairment into the specific tasks the applicant will perform after arrival, and shows a realistic ability to deliver them over the period the need continues.

Who can sponsor

The applicant must be sponsored, and the sponsor can only be one of two people: the Australian relative the applicant claims to care for, if that relative has turned 18; or that relative's spouse or de facto partner, if the partner cohabits with the relative, is an Australian citizen, permanent resident or eligible New Zealand citizen, and has turned 18 [cl 116.212].

The undertaking

The sponsor gives a formal undertaking to assist the applicant, to the extent necessary, financially and in relation to accommodation, for the two years immediately following the applicant's first entry to Australia under the visa [reg 1.20(2)(a)]. It is an undertaking, not an income test. A low income is not, by itself, a correct reason to refuse on sponsorship, though the sponsor's capacity to understand and give the undertaking can still matter.

Approved and in force at decision, and not swapped mid-process

The sponsorship criteria run in two stages that must not be merged. Clause 116.212 is a time-of-application criterion: it asks whether the applicant was sponsored by a qualifying person when the application was made, and later events do not retrospectively defeat a criterion that was satisfied at that time [cl 116.212]. At decision the question moves on: the sponsorship must have been approved by the Minister and still be in force [cl 116.222]. There is no mechanism to substitute a sponsor after lodgement, so a sponsor who dies or withdraws leaves no approved sponsorship in force at decision, and the usual outcome is a fresh application with a new sponsor rather than a swap on the existing file. A later change in the sponsor's circumstances, for example a partner-sponsor who stops cohabiting with the Australian relative, does not by itself send the case back to a fresh application: the correct inquiry is whether the approved sponsorship remains in force at decision, not whether the sponsor would still qualify under the application-time clause today. Over a long offshore wait, sponsor status is therefore something to monitor, not set and forget.

Consent and capacity

Where the resident or the sponsor cannot meaningfully consent (for instance a sponsor with a mental-capacity issue, or a resident who cannot consent to the care arrangement), the questions of who can lawfully give instructions, and whether guardianship or substitute decision-making is needed, are matters of general law and professional responsibility, not resolved by the carer clauses themselves. They should be sorted out before the care plan or the sponsorship undertaking is relied on, because an undertaking or care arrangement that no one is lawfully authorised to give cannot safely support the application.

Being offshore is a validity requirement, not a curable detail

The applicant must be outside Australia when the application is made [Sch 1 item 1123A(3)(aa)]. This is not a grant-stage matter that can be fixed later: an application made while the applicant is in Australia is invalid.

Evidence the medical assessment has been sought must accompany the application

A carer application must be accompanied by satisfactory evidence that the relevant medical assessment has been sought [Sch 1 item 1123A(3)(c)]. This is a validity requirement in its own right, and it sits lower than the certificate itself: the completed CVAC is a criterion for grant, but at lodgement it is enough to show the Bupa assessment has been initiated. Lodging with nothing on the medical assessment risks an invalid application, not merely a weak one.

The sponsorship form: not a validity requirement, but a practice issue

The sponsorship form is not a Schedule 1 validity requirement, so its absence does not make the application invalid. As a matter of practice, an unsigned or inconsistent form may stall an otherwise valid application. Lodge it complete, and confirm the current approved form and lodgement channel before filing.

The decision-time criteria must still be satisfied at decision

Section 85 permits the Minister to set a financial-year maximum by legislative instrument; section 86 prevents further grants only when an applicable determination has reached that maximum. [MA s 85] [MA s 86] LIN 26/042 capped Other Family (Migrant) Class BO and Other Family (Residence) Class BU grants for 2025–26, but repealed on 1 July 2026. As at 12 July 2026, no 2026–27 section 85 determination had been located. [LIN 26/042 ss 4, 7–8] Separately, Home Affairs continues to administer Other Family applications in queue order. Any cap status or processing-time figure is current operational information to confirm from departmental and legislative sources, not a fixed legal period. The legal consequence of the delay is the point to hold onto: the decision-time criteria in the 116.22-series must still be satisfied at decision, so a file that was sound at lodgement has to still hold together years later.

If the care receiver's condition changes

The applicant must still be a carer of the Australian relative at decision [cl 116.221]. A care receiver who dies, or whose condition improves to the point that substantial and continuing assistance is no longer required, puts the grant at risk even though the claim was genuine at lodgement. A different person in the family beginning to need care during the wait does not simply substitute into the existing application: the safer working assumption is that a materially different care-need foundation calls for a fresh application.

If a dependent child ages out

A child included as a secondary applicant must still be a member of the family unit at decision [cl 116.311] [cl 116.321]. A child who turns 18 and is not dependent, turns 23, marries, enters a de facto relationship, or otherwise ceases to be a dependent child under reg 1.05A can drop out of the family unit during the wait [reg 1.12] [reg 1.05A]. Dependency has to be evidenced as current at decision, not merely at lodgement, so the composition of the application can quietly change while it sits in the queue.

One member's problem can defeat the whole application

Both the primary applicant and each family member who is also an applicant must satisfy the integrity criterion PIC 4020 [cl 116.223] [cl 116.226] [PIC 4020]. PIC 4020(2) works across the family unit: if the applicant or any member of the family unit has been refused a visa for a bogus-document or false-information failure, in the period from three years before the application was made until the visa is decided, the whole combined application can be refused, not only the person at fault [PIC 4020]. That is the real one-fails-all-fail mechanism, and because it is judged at decision, integrity has to hold across the long wait.

The sponsor applies only if the offshore refusal is reviewable

A 116 cannot be granted while the applicant is in the migration zone, but sponsorship eligibility under clause 116.212 does not by itself establish review jurisdiction. The offshore-sponsored-refusal branch in section 338(5) must be satisfied for the refusal to be a reviewable migration decision. In particular, where the sponsor is a New Zealand citizen, that branch requires the sponsor to hold a special category visa; being an eligible New Zealand citizen who can sponsor under clause 116.212 is not enough on its own [cl 116.212] [MA s 338(5)(b)]. Only after section 338(5) is satisfied may the review application be made by the sponsor rather than the visa applicant [MA s 347A(1)(b)]. Standing must therefore be checked before filing against both the refusal and the sponsor's precise status.

The deadline is short and cannot be extended

The application to the Administrative Review Tribunal must be made within 28 days after the applicant is notified of the decision, or within 14 days if the person is in immigration detention on the day of notification [MA s 347(3)]. The Tribunal cannot extend this period [MA s 347(5)], so the time runs hard from notification and a late application is simply out of time.

Aim the review at the real weakness

Where the refusal turned on the care-gap evidence rather than the medical facts, the review focus is the evidence about whether other Australian relatives and Australian services could reasonably provide the care, not a restatement of the diagnosis.

A NOICC under section 116 is the Minister's written notice that there appear to be grounds for cancellation, with particulars of the grounds and the information relied on, and an invitation to respond [s 119]. It is an urgent procedural task, not a routine request.

Lock down the procedural picture before any drafting: which visa is at risk; the exact ground alleged; whether the client is in Australia; whether the visa is still in effect; how and when the notice was served [s 494B] and any deemed-receipt rule [s 494C]; the response deadline; whether the adverse information relied on has actually been put to the client; whether any interview has occurred and whether late evidence can still be lodged before the decision; whether family members or bridging visas are exposed; and whether urgent evidence needs securing before it is lost. A misread deadline or a missed item of relevant information can be more damaging than a weak argument. Whether the client is in Australia matters structurally as well: s 119 is subject to Subdivision F, under which the Minister may cancel the visa of a person outside Australia without prior notice [s 128]. Section 129 then provides notice of the cancellation and an invitation to show that the ground did not exist or that there is a reason to revoke it [s 129]; after considering the response, the Minister makes the revocation decision under s 131 [s 131]. An offshore client may therefore first hear of the cancellation only once it has already happened.

If relevant information within s 120 was not disclosed in the s 119 notice, the Minister must give the holder particulars of it, explain why it is relevant, and invite comment before cancellation [s 120]. Undisclosed adverse information may create a natural-justice vulnerability in the decision.

In two layers, kept apart. First, contest the ground: whether the alleged ground exists at all on the facts. Second, if the ground may be made out, argue the discretion: why the visa should nonetheless not be cancelled. The two rest on different evidence - disproving the Department's facts is quite different from showing hardship or compliance history - and running them as one blurred plea weakens both. Win on the ground if possible; hold the discretionary case in reserve.

The discretionary layer weighs hardship, children's interests, family separation, health, study, employment, community ties, the seriousness and circumstances of any breach, remorse, cooperation, prior compliance, likely future conduct, and the consequences for future pathways. Structure it for the decision maker: clear headings, a detailed client statement, and evidence tracking each factor - the strongest submissions tie each asserted hardship to a specific piece of evidence. Family consequences carry weight only when evidenced: a child's schooling, a dependant's medical needs, the concrete effect of separation, and any consequential cancellation of associated visas should each be shown, not asserted - and where children are affected, address whether their interests are a primary or important consideration in the discretion.

Section 116(1) is a menu of discretionary grounds, and the response should be built on the exact ground alleged, not on a generic idea of "cancellation risk": (a) the grant rested on a fact or circumstance that is no longer the case; (aa) the grant rested on a fact or circumstance that did not exist; (b) the holder has not complied with a condition; (c) another person required to comply with a condition has not complied; (d) incorrect-information liability before immigration clearance; (e) the holder's presence is or may be a risk to the health, safety or good order of the Australian community (or a segment of it), or to the health or safety of an individual; (f) the visa should not have been granted because the application or grant contravened the Act or another Commonwealth law; (fa) a student-visa holder is not, or is likely not to be, a genuine student, or has engaged, is engaging, or is likely to engage, while in Australia, in conduct (including omissions) not contemplated by the visa; (g) a prescribed ground [s 116(1)].

Three further subsections sit beside the (1) menu and are easy to miss: s 116(1AA) (identity not established to the Minister's satisfaction), s 116(1AB) (incorrect information, given at any time, that was taken into account in enabling a visa application or a grant decision, and is outside Subdivision C), and s 116(1AC) (payment-for-visas conduct) [s 116]. They matter because the s 117(2) permanent-visa protection reaches only subsection (1), and because cancellations under (1AA) and (1AB) are themselves exclusion-period risk factors [PIC 4013]. The discretion is also bounded at both ends: circumstances prescribed for s 116(3) make cancellation mandatory [s 116(3)] [reg 2.43(2)], while under s 116(2) the Minister is not to cancel certain temporary visas under s 116(1)(b) for breach of a restricted work condition where the prescribed workplace-exploitation circumstances cumulatively exist - a certificate from a certifying entity, a connection between the breach and the exploitation matter, satisfaction as to future compliance, and the holder's written commitment - and the protection is disapplied where the holder has previously broken such a commitment [reg 2.43B].

Where the narrow no-cancellation rule in reg 2.43B does not apply, reg 2.43A still requires the Minister to consider the prescribed workplace-exploitation matters in exercising the s 116 discretion: any prescribed certificate, the connection between the alleged breach and exploitation, the visa's purpose, the holder's commitments in Australia, and relevant prior failures [s 116(1A)] [reg 2.43A]. Falling outside reg 2.43B therefore does not mean that the Regulations provide no workplace-exploitation protection.

Timing is the organising idea: paragraph (aa) is a "never entitled" allegation, met by evidence of the position at grant, while paragraph (a) is a "no longer entitled" allegation, met by evidence of what changed and when. Getting that wrong produces the wrong evidence strategy. And if the Department has selected a ground that does not fit the facts, the mismatch itself assists the response before discretion is ever reached.

The boundary turns on immigration clearance. While the holder has not entered or has entered but not been immigration cleared, an incorrect-information or bogus-document concern can be dealt with under section 116 itself, because the power reaches a holder who would be liable to cancellation under Subdivision C had they been cleared [s 116(1)(d)]. After immigration clearance, the same conduct is normally dealt with under the separate section 109 power, with its own notice and procedure [s 107] [s 109]. Which side of the line the person is on determines which power and which procedure apply - remembering that s 116(1AB) supplies a third route for incorrect information falling outside Subdivision C, and s 116(1AA) a dedicated identity power [s 116].

In responding, obtain the decision record where possible, identify what information was actually relied on, and distinguish a confirmed identity from a fraudulent identity, an innocent mistake, an inconsistency, and a later correction. Where the grant is said to have rested on a fact that did not exist, set out the timeline carefully - the question is what was true, and what was relied on, at the moment of grant [s 116(1)(aa)].

Weigh the future consequences before deciding how to respond: a cancellation in the incorrect-information family is among the bases that feed the later exclusion-period criterion, so the damage can outlast the cancellation itself [PIC 4013].

For a breach allegation under s 116(1)(b), first confirm the condition was lawfully imposed and actually applied to this visa - check the actual grant record rather than an assumption about what the condition probably said. Then address whether the alleged conduct breached the condition, what evidence supports or contradicts it, whether any breach was deliberate or accidental, and the context that informs the discretion. A condition-breach cancellation does not sit in the incorrect-information exclusion limb, but it can engage the exclusion period directly through its own limbs - a cancellation because the person was found to have worked without authority, or because a condition specified for the visa's subclass was breached - as well as through the separate prescribed-ground route, so the precise ground and condition matter [PIC 4013].

Section 116(1)(c) allows cancellation because another person required to comply with a condition has not complied. Identify whose conduct is relied on, their connection to the holder, whether the holder knew of or could control the issue, and whether cancelling an innocent holder's visa would be disproportionate to their own role - that fairness point is itself a discretionary argument, and it matters most in family and dependant situations.

Risk grounds. Section 116(1)(e) reaches presence that "is or may be, or would or might be" a risk to health, safety or good order - a low threshold, so the response must be firmly evidence-focused. Keep allegations, charges, convictions, conduct, actual risk, and speculation in separate categories: a charge is not guilt, and an allegation is not a finding. Useful material includes court documents, police material, treatment and rehabilitation records, employment and study evidence, community support, and compliance history - the aim is to pull the assessment back from a worst-case characterisation to what the evidence establishes.

Student grounds. Section 116(1)(fa) has two limbs: the holder is not (or is likely not to be) a genuine student, or has engaged, is engaging, or is likely to engage, while in Australia, in conduct (including omissions) not contemplated by the visa. The conduct limb is prospective as well as retrospective, so "it has not happened yet" is not a complete answer. Identify the exact limb, then assemble enrolment, attendance, course progression, work history, and personal circumstances. A recurring error is answering a narrow technical point and assuming it disposes of the case - technical compliance with one condition may not answer the broader genuineness or conduct concern, so meet both the specific limb and the wider picture it is said to reveal.

Immediately check lawful status, bridging-visa effects, detention risk, review rights and deadlines, future bars, and any remaining pathway.

Four structural consequences frame the advice. First, a permanent visa cannot be cancelled under s 116(1) at all if the holder is in the migration zone and was immigration cleared on last entry - the threshold protection should be checked before the ground is even engaged, remembering it reaches only subsection (1), not the (1AA)/(1AB)/(1AC) powers [s 117(2)]. Second, a cancellation can reach other people's visas: cancellation under s 109, s 116 or the other listed powers automatically cancels a visa held by another person as a member of the cancelled person's family unit, and supports discretionary cancellation, without notice, of a visa another person holds only because the cancelled person held one [s 140] - so the status fallout is wider than the visa named in the notice. A separate automatic rule applies where a child's visa was granted under s 78 because the parent held a visa: if that parent's visa is cancelled under any provision of the Migration Act, the child's visa is also automatically cancelled [s 140(3)] [s 78]. Third, a cancellation in the incorrect-information family can feed a later exclusion-period criterion in future applications [PIC 4013]. Fourth, the onshore further-application bar operates on a closed list of cancellation powers - s 109, s 116, s 133A, s 133C, s 134, s 137J, s 137Q [s 48(1)] - and a consequential cancellation under s 140 (made because a family member's visa was cancelled) is not in that list, so a Departmental assertion that a s 140-cancelled person is barred can be tested against the list itself [s 140].

The two bars have different triggers, different exceptions, and different exits, so the first task after any cancellation is to identify the actual legal basis of the decision.

A section 116 cancellation (like s 109 and the other listed powers) engages the onshore further-application bar in section 48 for a person who does not hold a substantive visa and was cancelled since last entering: the person may apply onshore only for a visa of a prescribed class, subject to the regulations [s 48] [reg 2.12]. It does not trigger section 501E.

Section 501E is engaged only by a refusal or cancellation under s 501, s 501A, s 501B, or s 501BA that has not been set aside or revoked - a closed trigger list [s 501E]. Its exceptions are narrow: a protection visa application; visas specified in the regulations for s 501E(2)(b) purposes, including Bridging R (Class WR) [reg 2.12AA] (do not confuse this with reg 2.20A, which governs how a Bridging R application is taken to be lodged, not the exception list [reg 2.20A]); the s 501E(3) situation where the Minister acting personally has since granted the person a permanent visa; and the s 501E(4) situation where the person was earlier granted a visa of a kind referred to in subsection (2) or (3) and would otherwise have been barred from applying for it [s 501E(4)]. Subsections (2), (3) and (4) are separate exceptions, not one structure. A s 499 direction cannot create an additional exception [s 499(2)]. Setting aside or revoking the trigger decision removes the trigger; for a mandatory cancellation under s 501(3A), revocation is considered through s 501CA [s 501CA]. But this is not the only way the particular application-time bar can stop applying: s 501E(1) applies where the application time occurs during a continuous period throughout which the person is in the migration zone, so leaving that continuous period also ends this onshore application bar. Separate offshore application, grant and return barriers may still prevent a viable pathway [s 501E(1)].

Advice on "what can be lodged next" therefore changes entirely with the basis of the cancellation: s 116 leads to the s 48 prescribed-class analysis, while a s 501-family decision leads to the s 501E analysis with its own exceptions and exit path.